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Potential for international spread of wild
poliovirus via travelers
Annelies Wilder-Smith1,2*, Wei-Yee Leong1, Luis Fernandez Lopez3,8, Marcos Amaku4, Mikkel Quam5,
Kamran Khan6,7 and Eduardo Massad8,9
Abstract
Background: The endgame of polio eradication is hampered by the international spread of poliovirus via travelers.
In response to ongoing importations of poliovirus into polio-free countries, on 5 May 2014, WHO’s Director-General
declared the international spread of wild poliovirus a public health emergency of international concern. Our
objective was to develop a mathematical model to estimate the international spread of polio infections.
Methods: Our model took into account polio endemicity in polio-infected countries, population size, polio
immunization coverage rates, infectious period, the asymptomatic-to-symptomatic ratio, and also the probability of
a traveler being infectious at the time of travel. We applied our model to three scenarios: (1) number of exportations of
both symptomatic and asymptomatic polio infections out of currently polio-infected countries, (2) the risk of
spread of poliovirus to Saudi Arabia via Hajj pilgrims, and (3) the importation risk of poliovirus into India.
Results: Our model estimated 665 polio exportations (>99 % of which were asymptomatic) from nine polio-infected
countries in 2014, of which 78.3 % originated from Pakistan. Our model also estimated 21 importations of poliovirus
into Saudi Arabia via Hajj pilgrims and 20 poliovirus infections imported to India in the same year.
Conclusion: The extent of importations of asymptomatic and symptomatic polio infections is substantial. For
countries that are vulnerable to polio outbreaks due to poor national polio immunization coverage rates, our
newly developed model may help guide policy-makers to decide whether imposing an entry requirement in terms
of proof of vaccination against polio would be justified.
Keywords: Poliomyelitis, Travel, Importation, International spread, Secondary cases, Polio vaccination, India, Hajj
pilgrimage, Policy, Polio eradication, Mathematical model
Background
Polio will remain a global problem as long as there is still
one case in the world. By 2012, the annual number of
polio cases due to wild poliovirus (WPV) had decreased
by >99 % since the polio eradication program was
launched in 1988. However, three countries never inter-
rupted WPV transmission: Afghanistan, Nigeria, and
Pakistan [1]. In 2013 an upsurge of cases was observed
caused by outbreaks in five previously polio-free countries,
triggered by importation of WPV via travelers. Preventing
the further spread of WPV into polio-free countries and
the ensuing outbreaks is therefore a top priority in eradi-
cating polio.
Given WPV’s infectiousness and long period of virus ex-
cretion, epidemics in previously polio-free countries via
travelers importing WPV is not surprising, and has been
documented on many occasions. Reinfection of 19 polio-
free African countries occurred in 2009 alone [2]. The
outbreak of 199 polio cases in Somalia in 2013-2014 was
due to an introduction of poliovirus of Nigerian origin [3].
A large outbreak of poliomyelitis, with 463 laboratory-
confirmed cases, took place in 2010 in Tajikistan after a
single importation of WPV from India in 2009, with fur-
ther expansion into neighboring Kazakhstan, Russia,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan [4]. After being polio-free
for more than 10 years, an outbreak occurred in China in
2011 in Xinjiang imported from neighboring Pakistan [5].
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In more recent years, the upsurge of polio cases in
Pakistan led to exportation of the virus to the Middle
East with new alarming outbreaks in Syria and Iraq
[6, 7]. Furthermore, a higher proportion of adults has
been observed in those affected by the outbreaks as a re-
sult of importation [8]. The Hajj pilgrimage has also
been considered a high risk for importation of WPV
from the remaining polio-infected countries that to a
large extent contain Muslim populations [9]. In sum-
mary, from 2003 to 2014, there were 191 documented
new importation events into previously polio-free coun-
tries, resulting in 3,763 reported cases of paralytic polio
in 43 countries and costing $1.15 billion in additional
funds from international organizations and agencies
alone for outbreak control [10].
In response to ongoing importations of poliovirus into
polio-free countries, on 5 May 2014, the Director-General
of the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the
international spread of WPV a public health emergency of
international concern (PHEIC). Given that such a declar-
ation has only been made for Ebola and influenza, this
declaration highlights how seriously WHO considers the
threat to polio eradication due to the ongoing inter-
national spread of poliovirus. WHO announced temporary
recommendations to ensure that all travelers departing
from polio-infected countries receive a polio vaccination
(oral or injectable polio vaccine) between 4 weeks and 12
months before international travel, and should ensure that
such travelers are provided with proof of vaccination [11].
India did not even wait for this declaration. In early 2014,
India was declared polio-free by WHO after a three-year
interval without any polio cases [12]. This achievement
came at a high price. India is now understandably con-
cerned about reintroduction via travelers - a concern that
is justified given its proximity to two countries with cur-
rently the highest number of polio cases (Pakistan and
Afghanistan). To prevent reintroduction of polio, India
therefore decided to tighten cross-border travel rules by
introducing a new polio vaccine requirement for all trav-
elers from polio-infected countries entering India. The
Government of India’s Ministry of Health and Family Wel-
fare has announced that “Resident nationals of the cur-
rently seven polio infected countries are required to
receive a dose of oral polio vaccine (OPV), regardless of
age and vaccination status, at least four weeks prior to de-
parture to India. A certificate of vaccination with OPV is
required for resident nationals of these countries while ap-
plying for entry visa to India” [13].
Given WHO’s recent focus on the contribution of the
international spread of poliovirus via travelers, it is im-
portant and timely to assess the potential for further
spread. Reliance on reported events of importation
will only underestimate the true importation risk, as
not every imported case will be detected and reported,
especially in countries with poor surveillance systems.
Furthermore, not every imported case will lead to sec-
ondary cases, and polio importations without secondary
cases are likely to remain unnoticed. Both asymptomatic
and symptomatic cases can contribute to transmission
[14], and asymptomatic polio infections (that also re-
main unreported) need to be taken into account when
assessing the international spread of polio. In the ab-
sence of reliable surveillance data, mathematical model-
ing is necessary to estimate the number of importations
or exportations of polio.
Our objective was to develop a mathematical model to
estimate the international spread of symptomatic and
asymptomatic polio infections. We then applied our
model to three scenarios: (1) number of exportations of
both symptomatic and asymptomatic polio infections
out of currently polio-infected countries, (2) the risk of
spread of poliovirus to Saudi Arabia via Hajj pilgrims,
and (3) the importation risk of poliovirus into India via
travelers from polio-infected countries.
Methods
We first obtained data on the number of polio cases re-
ported to WHO in the years 2010 to 2014 [15] including
obtaining the number of polio cases classified by WHO
as being the result of importation. We calculated the
proportion of imported polio over all polio cases per
year for the 15 years from 2010 to 2014.
We then adapted a Susceptible -> Infected -> Recov-
ered (SIR) model and fed the following facts and
parameters about polio into the model: published esti-
mates of the ratio of inapparent to paralytic illness vary
from 50:1 to 1,000:1 (usually 200:1) [14]. We assumed a
ratio of 200:1. Persons infected with wild poliovirus
(WPV) are most infectious from 7 to 10 days before
and after the onset of symptoms, but poliovirus may be
present in the stool for up to 3 to 6 weeks [14], with the
mean duration of WPV type 1 excretion in fecal speci-
mens being 24 days (median, 20 to 29 days), with a
range of 1 to 114 days [16, 17]. We assumed that the
duration of infectiousness for our models is 4 weeks
and that the life expectancy for every country is equal
to 60 years (1/μi=60). We also assumed, for simplicity,
that the probability of poliovirus infection is independ-
ent of the probability of travel and that poliovirus infec-
tions are homogeneously distributed in polio-affected
countries.
In the following paragraphs we explain how the model
was developed. The model variables and parameters are
described in Table 1. The model equations are shown in
Box 1.
The general equation describing the time variation in
reported polio cases in country i, in year t, Ii(t), is given
by Equation (1) in Box 1.
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In Equation (1), λi(t) is the force of infection (per
capita number of new infections per time unit), Si(t) is
the number of susceptible individuals at time t, 1μi is the
life expectancy of the population in the country i, and 1γ i
is the average duration of infection in country i. The
number of susceptible individuals is given by the size of
the population multiplied by one minus the proportion
of polio vaccination coverage. Equation (1) describes the
dynamics of infectious individuals. It expresses the time
variation in the number of infective people, and it con-
tains two terms, one income (positive) term provided by
the disease incidence (with rate λi(t)Si(t)) and one out-
come (negative) term provided by natural deaths (with
rate μi), and the recovery of infected individuals (with
rate γi).
The number of polio cases in country i at year t is
given by the number of cases at the year the cohort
started to be followed up I(0) times the number of indi-
viduals who survived up until year t, plus the number of
new cases of infection (see Equation (2) in Box 1).
We consider the reported number of cases for the year
t in country i (Equation (2) of Box 1) and assumed that
this annual incidence is constant along each year, that is,
there is no seasonal variation.
As we assumed a 200:1 asymptomatic-to-symptomatic
ratio, we multiplied the number of reported cases at year t
in country i (Λi(t) in Equation (3) of Box 1).
Dividing Equation (3) from Box 1 by the number of
susceptible individuals Si(t) at year t in country i, we ob-
tain the prevalence pi(t) in year t in country i. Multiply-
ing pi(t) by the number of non-immune travelers from
country i, we obtain the expected number of polio cases
among travelers.
Box 1. Model equations as explained in the main text
The general equation for the variation in polio cases in country i,
in year t, Ii(t), is given by:
dIi tð Þ
dt
¼ λi tð ÞSi tð Þ− μi þ γið ÞIi tð Þ ð1Þ
where λi(t) is the force of infection (per capita number of new
infections per time), Si(t) is the number of susceptible individuals
at time t, 1μi is the life expectancy of the population in country i,
and 1γi is the average duration of infection in country i. The
number of susceptible individuals is given by the size of the
population multiplied by one minus the proportion of polio
vaccination coverage. Equation (1) describes the dynamics of
infectious individuals. It expresses the time variation in the
number of infective people and it contains two terms, one
income (positive) term provided by the disease incidence
(with rate λi(t)Si(t)) and one outcome (negative) term provided by
natural deaths (with rate μi), and the recovery of infected
individuals (with rate γi).
Equation (1) can be integrated by standard methods,
resulting in:
Ii tð Þ ¼ Ii 0ð Þe− μiþγið Þt þ
Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t
′
 
e− μiþγið Þ t−t
′ð Þdt ð2Þ
We consider
Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t′
 
dt, the reported number of cases
along the year t in country i, and assume this annual incidence
as constant in each year. Equation (2), therefore, simplifies to
Ii tð Þ ¼ Ii 0ð Þe− μiþγið Þt þ Λi tð Þ
1−e− μiþγið Þt
 
μi þ γið Þ
( )
ð3Þ
Where Λi tð Þ ¼
Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t′
 
dt for each individual year t.
Dividing Equation (3) by the number of susceptible individuals Si(t)
in year t in country i, we obtain the prevalence pi(t) in year t in
country i:
pi tð Þ ¼ pi 0ð Þe− μiþγið Þt þ Λi tð Þ
1−e− μiþγið Þt
 
Si tð Þ μi þ γið Þ
( )
ð4Þ
Multiplying pi(t) by the number of non-immune travelers from
country i, we obtain the expected number of polio cases among
travelers.
Table 1 Variables and parameters of the model
Variable Biological description Sources
Si(t) Number of susceptible
individuals in country
i at time t
Calculated from the total
population in country i at
year t times the probability
of not being vaccinated
Ii(t) Number of polio cases in
country i at time t
Calculated from the model
pi(t) Prevalence of polio in
country i at time t
Calculated from the model
Parameter Biological description
λi(t) Force of infection in
country i at time t
Calculated from the number
of reported cases in country
i at year t
1/μi Life expectancy of
population in country i
[26]
1/γi Average duration of
infection in country i
Reference [14]
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We conducted a sensitivity analysis for the model,
which is described in detail in Box 2. After developing
the model, we applied it to three scenarios:
(1). Exportation of polio infections (asymptomatic
and symptomatic) from polio-infected countries in
the years 2013-2014.
We obtained data on the countries that had polio
cases reported to WHO from the website indicated
in Ref. [15]. The number of travelers departing
these polio-affected countries was obtained from
the International Air Transport Association
(IATA). We applied Equation (3) to estimate the
expected number of polio exportations, taking
into account the degree of polio immunization
coverage rates (oral polio vaccine) for the countries,
outbound travel, asymptomatic-symptomatic ratio,
and population size.
(2). International spread of poliovirus via Hajj
pilgrims in the years 2013 and 2014.
As the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia has
withdrawn its public website on the number of
annual Hajj pilgrims, we estimated the number of
Hajj pilgrims from earlier reports in the published
literature [18]. We then applied the same equation
as for scenario 1 to estimate the risk of
international importation of poliovirus via Hajj
pilgrims into Saudi Arabia.
(3). Importation of poliovirus into India in the years
2010-2014:
We selected the seven countries for which India
has issued the requirement for proof of vaccination
against polio (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria) [13] and
obtained the numbers of nationals from these
countries traveling to India from India’s tourism
statistics [19]. The travelers include those arriving
by air, ground, and sea. The population size per
country was obtained from the World Bank. The
number of wild-type polio cases and the national
polio immunization coverage rates were obtained
from WHO [20]. We also obtained data on travel
volume and force of infection for the years 2010
to 2014, using the same assumptions for all the
variables except for population size, travel volume,
and force of infection, where we used the yearly
available data. We also took into account that
in different years additional polio-infected
countries existed.
Results
In 2013, imported polio cases accounted for the majority
of all reported polio cases 256 of 416 cases (corresponding
to Fig. 1) shows the proportion of imported polio cases
Box 2. Sensitivity of the model to the parameters
For a small variation of parameter Pari, ΔPari, the variation in the
parameter-dependent variable π, Δπ, is given by the well-known
error propagation formula26:
Δπ ¼
X
i
∂π
∂Pari
 ΔPari ð5Þ
The relative variation in the risk π, Δπ/π, as a function of the
relative variation in the parameters ΔPari/Pari, is therefore:
Δπ
π
¼
X
i
Pari
∂π
∂Pari
 ΔPari
Pari
 1
π
ð6Þ
We calculated the sensitivity of Equation (3) of Box 1 to the
natural mortality rate of hosts, μ:
Δp tð Þ
p tð Þ ¼
∂p tð Þ
∂μ
 Δ μ
μ
 μ
p tð Þ ð7Þ
Where
∂p tð Þ
∂μ
¼ −tpi 0ð Þe− μ2þγið Þt−
( Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t
′
 
dt′
2
4
3
5 1−e− μiþγið Þt 
Si tð Þ μi þ γið Þ2
( )
þ
Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t
′
 
dt′
2
4
3
5 e− μiþγið Þt 
Si tð Þ
( ))
∂λ
∂γ
ð8Þ
is the partial derivative of time-dependent prevalence with
respect to the natural mortality rate of hosts μ.
An identical result is obtained for ∂p tð Þ∂γ .
The result of ∂p tð Þ∂γ is much simpler:
∂p tð Þ
∂λ
¼ 1− exp − μþ γð Þtð Þ½ 
S tð Þ μþ γð Þ ð9Þ
Therefore, the equations for the sensitivity analysis are:
Δp tð Þ
μ
¼ −tpi 0ð Þe− μiþγið Þt−
( Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t
′
 
dt′
2
4
3
5 1−e− μiþγið Þt 
Si tð Þ μi þ γið Þ2
( )
þ
Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t
′
 
dt′
2
4
3
5 e− μiþγið Þt 
Si tð Þ
( ))
∂λ
∂μ
 Δμ
μ
 p tð Þ
π
 
ð10Þ
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per year from 2000-2014. Over those 15 years, the pro-
portion of polio cases as a result of importation in-
creased significantly, and accounted for 62 % in the
year 2013. The years 2005 and 2010 were also the years
that showed a very high proportion of polio as a result
of importation (53 % and 83 %, respectively).
In Table 2, we summarize the number of modeled
exported cases from polio-infected countries in the years
2013 and 2014. The expected number of exported polio
cases in 2013 was 462, of which half were contributed by
Pakistan (n = 158) and Somalia (n = 121). Among these
countries, Somalia had the highest number of polio cases
in 2013 (n = 194) in that particular year and the lowest
vaccination coverage rate (47 %). In the year 2014, Somalia
had far fewer endemic polio cases, but polio infections tri-
pled in Pakistan. Given the high travel volume between
Pakistan and India, the estimated overall annual polio ex-
portations increased from 2013 to 2014 to 665.
Table 3 shows the estimated number of exported cases
by outbound travel of Hajj pilgrims from the countries
that reported polio cases to WHO in 2013 and 2014.
Our findings indicated that in 2013 a total of 20 cases
were exported from these polio-infected countries.
Somalia (n = 8) and Pakistan (n = 6) were the two coun-
tries with the highest exportation, contributing 70 % of
the total exported cases. Although there were reported
polio cases in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Cameroon, based on
our model, they did not contribute to any exportation.
In 2014, the number of importations via Hajj pilgrims
was 21, and Pakistan contributed to most of these im-
portations (19 out of 21).
Figure 2 shows the routes of potential polio importation
into India in 2014. The results of the application of Equa-
tion (3) for the case of polio importation into India by
travelers are shown in Tables 4 and 5. The total number
of estimated polio importations from nine polio-infected
countries summed up to 20 polio infections imported to
India in the year 2014 (Table 4). Afghanistan and Pakistan,
both countries in close geographical proximity to India,
contributed all 20 of the imported polio infections (13
from Pakistan, 7 from Afghanistan). Table 5 shows that
the highest importation risk (24 estimated importations)
into India for the years 2010-2013 was in the year 2010
when 20 countries had at least one polio case. In 2011,
there were 22 estimated importations; in 2012, 11 impor-
tations; and in 2013, 13 importations of polio infections
into India.
Sensitivity analysis: The sensitivity analysis in Box 2
shows that the model is about 12 times less sensitive to
μ and γ than to λ. In other words, the force of infection
in the epidemic source country is the main driving factor
for the importation risk, combined with the travel vol-
ume. However, note that λ is covariate with μ and γ. As
we do not know the exact relationship among them, it is
not possible to calculate either ∂λ∂μ or
∂λ
∂γ, and thus the sen-
sitivity analysis incomplete.
Discussion
Although the number of global polio cases has been de-
clining over the past 15 years, as shown in Fig. 1, the
proportion of polio as a result of importation is increas-
ing, which is a major concern to polio eradication. The
proportion has ranged from 0 to 62 % over the past 15
years, with the years 2005, 2010, and 2013 reporting the
highest proportions. However, these numbers do not re-
flect importation events, but rather the overall polio
cases in non-endemic polio countries as a result of im-
portation from polio-endemic or polio-infected coun-
tries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Nigeria being the only
endemic countries since 2010). These proportions hence
cannot inform from where the importation originated
and how many travelers imported polio. Here, we have
developed a mathematical model to address this gap.
Our model not only takes into account polio endemicity
(force of infection), population size, polio vaccination
Δp tð Þ
γ
¼ −tpi 0ð Þe− μiþγið Þt−
( Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t
′
 
dt′
2
4
3
5 1−e− μiþγið Þt 
Si tð Þ μi þ γið Þ2
( )
þ
Z t
0
λi t′
 
Si t
′
 
dt′
2
4
3
5 e− μiþγið Þt 
Si tð Þ
( ))
∂λ
∂μ
 Δμ
γ
 p tð Þ
γ
 
ð11Þ
Δp tð Þ
λ
¼ 1− exp − μþ γð Þtð Þ½ 
S tð Þ μþ γð Þ 
Δμ
λ
 p tð Þ
λ
ð12Þ
As the sensitivity of the prevalence to the parameters is an explicit
function of time, as time passes (t→ ∞), the values settle to:
Δp
λ
≅
Δμ
λ
ð13Þ
that is, for every 1 % variation in the force of infection there will be
approximately 1 % variation in the time-dependent prevalence.
For the other two parameters μ and γ the results are:
Δp
μ
≅
1
12
Δμ
μ
ð14Þ
And
Δp
γ
≅−
1
12
Δγ
γ
ð15Þ
that is, the model is about 12 times less sensitive to μ and γ
than to λ.
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coverage, and infectious period, but also the probability
of a traveler being infectious at the time of travel. As
both symptomatic and asymptomatic polio infections are
known to transmit the virus, our model includes asymp-
tomatic cases. As the ratio of asymptomatic to symptom-
atic polio is very high, most of our estimated importations
of poliovirus are via asymptomatic travelers, and hence
our estimated numbers of importation/exportation ap-
pear high. Our sensitivity analysis shows that the force
of infection in the epidemic source country is the main
driving factor for the importation risk, combined with
the travel volume.
Fig. 1 Polio cases (endemic versus imported) 2000-2014
Table 2 Estimated exported polio infections from polio-infected countries for 2013 and 2014, accounting for a ratio of apparent to
inapparent polio infections of 200:1
Country Outbound
travelers a
(2012)
Vaccination
coverage
(2013) b
Population
size (2013) c
Symptomatic
cases (2013) d
Symptomatic
cases (2014) d
Asymptomatic
infections
(2013)
Asymptomatic
infections
(2014)
Exported polio
infections
(2013)
Exported polio
infections
(2014)
Pakistan 4,655,292 0.72 182,142,594 93 306 18,600 61,200 158 521
Afghanistan 792,905 0.71 30,551,674 14 28 2,800 5,600 24 48
Nigeria 1,829,727 0.67 173,615,345 53 6 10,600 1,200 37 4
Somalia 98,390 0.47 10,495,583 194 5 38,800 1,000 121 3
Syria 629,804 0.52 22,850,000 35 1 7,000 200 64 2
Ethiopia 1,249,894 0.7 94,100,756 9 1 1,800 200 8 1
Kenya 2,028,017 0.82 44,353,691 14 0 2,800 NC 43 NC
Cameroon 505,550 0.88 21,699,631 4 5 800 1,000 6 8
Equatorial
Guinea
168,530 0.30 757,014 0 5 NC 1,000 NC 74
Iraq 1,033,884 0.70 33,417,476 0 2 NC 400 NC 4
Total 12,991,993 613,983,764 416 359 83,200 71,800 462 665
a Data from International Air Transport Association (source: Bluedot; Kamran Khan)
b [27]
c [28] (2013)
d [15]
NC = not calculated
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In the year 2014, out of nine polio-affected countries,
we modeled that 665 polio infections (of which 662 were
asymptomatic, and only 3 symptomatic) were exported
globally. The majority of these poliovirus exportations
originated from Pakistan (521 out of 665; 78.3 %). The
number of polio exportations will vary from year to year.
In 2013, for example, there were 462 estimated exporta-
tions of polio infections, and less than half can be attrib-
uted to Pakistan, with Somalia contributing almost the
same amount as Pakistan, as there was a major polio out-
break in Somalia that year (Table 2). As per the sensitivity
analysis, we found that for every 1 % variation in the force
of infection there will be approximately 1 % variation in
the time-dependent prevalence in the country.
About 600 potential poliovirus importations from nine
polio-infected countries in one year into any country in
the world present a sizable problem. However, our model
cannot tell us how many of these importation events will
lead to secondary cases or even outbreaks. It is the na-
tional coverage of polio immunization in a country that
will determine its vulnerability for polio outbreaks after
importation. The polio vaccination coverage rate in any
given country together with the quality of its surveillance
system and the speed of outbreak response will deter-
mine the magnitude of outbreaks following importation.
Countries with high polio vaccination coverage rates
may still see importations of polio cases (the majority of
which will be asymptomatic and hence not detected),
but are unlikely to see secondary cases. For example,
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the United
States, and Singapore have reported importations, but
given their high immunization coverage rates, no single
secondary cases occurred [21, 22]. For Africa, Andre
Mach et al. recently assessed the risk for polio out-
breaks for 2013-2014, and the authors found 15 coun-
tries to be at high risk for WPV outbreaks, 5 at
moderate-to-high risk, and 6 at low risk [23]. In 15 of
the 33 African countries, less than half of the population
resides in areas where surveillance performance indica-
tors have met only minimum targets [23, 24].
Every year, the Hajj pilgrimage brings more than 2
million pilgrims from all over the world to Saudi Arabia,
an event that is characterized by overcrowding [9].
Many of these pilgrims are from Nigeria, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan - the three remaining polio-endemic coun-
tries - and other predominantly Moslem countries that
are polio-infected. Hence, there has been long-standing
concern about the potential introduction of polio into
the Hajj with subsequent international spread. Our
model estimated 20 importations of poliovirus into
Saudi Arabia via Hajj pilgrims in the year 2013, and 21
in the year 2014. About 20 potential importations need
to be taken seriously. Indeed, the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia has introduced mandatory polio vaccination at
the point of entry for all pilgrims coming from polio-
infected countries [9].
To prevent reintroduction of the poliovirus, in January
2014 India decided to tighten cross-border travel rules
by introducing a new polio vaccine requirement for all
travelers from polio-infected countries entering India
[12, 25]. We previously estimated the number of trav-
elers who would be affected by this new rule imposed
Table 3 Estimated imported polio infections to Saudi Arabia during the Hajj pilgrimage from polio-infected countries in 2013 and 2014
Country Hajj pilgrimsa
(2012)
Vaccination
coverage
(2013) b
Population
size (2013) c
Symptomatic
cases (2013)d
Symptomatic
cases (2014) d
Asymptomatic
infections
(2013)
Asymptomatic
infections
(2014)
Imported polio
infections
(2013)
Imported polio
infections
(2014)
Pakistan 172,610 0.72 182,142,594 93 306 18,600 61,200 6 19
Afghanistan 33,011 0.71 30,551,674 14 28 2,800 5,600 1 2
Nigeria 98,559 0.67 173,615,345 53 6 10,600 1,200 2 0
Somalia 6,540 0.47 10,495,583 194 5 38,800 1,000 8 0
Syria 30,921 0.52 22,850,000 35 1 7,000 200 3 0
Ethiopia 4,009 0.7 94,100,756 9 1 1,800 200 0 0
Kenya 2,480 0.82 44,353,691 14 0 2,800 NC 0 NC
Cameroon 3,570 0.88 21,699,631 4 5 800 1,000 0 0
Equatorial
Guinea
NA 0.30 757,014 0 5 NC 1,000 NC NC
Iraq 35,748 0.70 33,417,476 0 2 NC 400 NC 0
Total 384,968 613,983,764 416 359 83,200 71,800 20 21
a [18]
b [27]
c [28]
d [15]
NA = not available
NC = not calculated
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by the Indian government to be approximately 233,800
travelers annually from the seven countries to India, and
346,800 Indian national residents to these seven coun-
tries, in the year 2013 [25]. Our model now adds more
information: our findings estimate that 13 polio importa-
tions occurred in the year 2013, and 20 in 2014. In 2014,
100 % of these polio importations into India originated
from Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is not surprising
given that these two countries carry the main remaining
burden of polio and have the highest travel volume to
India. Although the travel volume from Pakistan to India
was of the same order of magnitude as that for Afghanistan
Fig. 2 Travelers from polio-infected countries entering India in 2014
Table 4 Estimated importations of polio infections into India in the year 2014
Country Travelers to India Polio cases
(2014)a
Asymptomatic
polio
Vaccination
coverage (2013) b
Population
size (2013) c
Force of
infection
p(t) Importation
Pakistan 111,794 (2013)d 306 61,200 0.72 182,142,594 0.000336 0.000111844 13
Afghanistan 111,370 (2013)d 28 5,600 0.71 30,551,674 0.000183296 6.10136E-05 7
Nigeria 65,968 (2012)e 6 1,200 0.67 173,615,345 6.91183E-06 2.30073E-06 0
Somalia 462 (2012)e 5 1,000 0.47 10,495,583 9.52782E-05 3.17152E-05 0
Syria 35,686 (2012)e 1 200 0.52 22,850,000 8.75274E-06 2.91351E-06 0
Ethiopia 11,795 (2012)e 1 200 0.7 94,100,756 2.12538E-06 7.07474E-07 0
Cameroon 1,515 (2012)e 5 1,000 0.88 21,699,631 4.60837E-05 1.53398E-05 0
Equatorial Guinea 796 (2012)e 5 1,000 0.30 757,014 0.00132098 0.000439713 0
Iraq 41,218 (2013) d 2 400 0.70 33,417,476 1.19698E-05 3.98437E-06 0
Total 380,604 359 71,800 569,630,073 20
a [15]
b [27]
c [28]
d [29]
e Data from United Nations World Tourism Organization
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Table 5 Estimated importations of polio infections into India (2010-2013)
Country Travelers to Indiaa Polio casesd Asymptomatic polio Vaccination coveragee Population sizef Importation
2010
Pakistan 51,749 144 28,800 0.82 173,149,306 3
Nigeria 23,893 21 4,200 0.54 159,707,780 0
Afghanistan 73,389 25 5,000 0.66 28,397,812 4
Niger 475 2 400 0.75 15,893,746 0
Chad 212 26 5,200 0.43 11,720,781 0
DRC NA 100 20,000 0.76 62,191,161 NC
Angola 1,620 33 6,600 0.92 19,549,124 0
Mali 495 4 800 0.8 13,985,961 0
Congo 1,930 441 88,200 0.9 4,111,715 14
India NA 42 8,400 0.7 1,205,624,648 NC
Uganda 3,011 4 800 0.79 33,987,213 0
Russia 122,048 14 2,800 0.98 142,385,523 1
Liberia 177 2 400 0.71 3,957,990 0
Nepal 104,374 6 1,200 0.83 26,846,016 2
Kazakhstan 8,786 1 200 0.98 16,321,581 0
Tajikistan NA 460 92,000 0.95 7,627,326 NC
Turkmenistan NA 3 600 0.96 5,041,995 NC
Senegal NA 18 3,600 0.79 12,950,564 NC
Mauritania 131 5 1,000 0.52 3,609,420 0
Sierra Leone NA 1 200 0.84 5,751,976 NC
TOTAL 392,290 1,352 270,400 1,952,811,638 24
2011
Pakistan 48,640 198 39,600 0.75 176,166,353 4
Nigeria 33,537 62 12,400 0.49 164,192,925 1
Afghanistan 89,605 80 16,000 0.68 29,105,480 16
Kenya 30,045 1 200 0.88 42,027,891 0
Niger 600 5 1,000 0.44 16,511,462 0
Chad 1,198 132 26,400 0.4 12,080,037 1
DRC NA 93 18,600 0.77 63,931,512 NC
CAR 37 4 800 0.47 4,436,217 0
China 142,218 21 4,200 0.99 1,344,130,000 0
Guinea 341 3 600 0.63 11,161,530 0
Cote d’Ivoire 637 36 7,200 0.58 19,389,954 0
Angola 1,891 5 1,000 0.85 20,180,490 0
Mali 815 7 1,400 0.78 14,416,737 0
Congo 3,623 1 200 0.9 4,225,359 0
Gabon 226 1 200 0.75 1,594,034 0
India NA 1 200 0.7 1,221,156,319 NC
TOTAL 353,413 650 130,000 3,144,706,300 22
2012
Pakistan 58,846 58 11,600 0.72 179,160,111 1
Nigeria 36,762 122 24,400 0.52 168,833,776 2
Afghanistan 95,231 37 7,400 0.71 29,824,536 8
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to India, the force of infection of polio was higher in
Pakistan, and hence the probability of importing polio
from Pakistan to India is higher compared to Afghanistan.
Given the high asymptomatic-to-symptomatic ratio, most
likely all 20 imported infections were asymptomatic.
The total expected number of importations may seem
low at first sight. However, one must consider that for
the year 2014 this figure implies an incidence of 20 per
380,604 travelers (5 polio infections per 100,000 trav-
elers), which is far from negligible. In other words, of
the total number of 72,159 asymptomatic and symptom-
atic polio infections in the nine countries, 20 (about
0.027 %) of them were estimated to have traveled to
India at the time of polio infection associated with viral
shedding. The number of secondary cases will depend
on the polio immunization coverage rate, which accord-
ing to WHO was 70 % for India [20]. Fortunately, no
single imported polio case was detected or officially re-
ported in India in the years 2013 or 2014. We added an
analysis of the preceding years (2010–2012) for com-
parison. The years 2010 and 2011 saw high numbers of
importations mainly due to the much higher number of
countries that reported at least one case of polio. As
even one importation event can lead to substantial out-
breaks associated with hundreds of million dollars spent
for their control [3, 4], our finding of 20 importations in
one year (2014) lends support to India’s strategy to pro-
tect its country from reinfection via travelers. India’s
new vaccine policy would affect approximately 380,000
travelers, and approximately 19,000 vaccinations need
to be administered per one averted poliovirus import-
ation. Given the tragic consequences of re-infecting
India with polio, the number of travelers that need to be
vaccinated to avert poliovirus importation would be jus-
tified. India’s emphasis should be on preventing polio
importation from Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Our model had the following limitations. For lack of
data, we assumed that the probability of poliovirus infec-
tion is independent of the probability of travel; and for
simplicity, we assumed that poliovirus infections are
homogeneously distributed in polio-affected countries.
These assumptions will lead to an overestimate of our
results. For the estimation of outbound travel from
polio-affected countries (scenario 1, Table 2), we ob-
tained data from IATA. These data capture an estimated
90 % of all passengers traveling on commercial airlines
worldwide, but do not incorporate land travel. Hence,
they tend to underestimate international travel volumes
between countries that share contiguous land borders
(that is, where land-based border crossings are com-
mon). The true exportation numbers may therefore be
even higher than we estimated, if ground travel volume
is included. Unfortunately, data on ground travel volume
is difficult to obtain for many of the polio-affected coun-
tries. However, India does publish the number of trav-
elers into its country, and these data include air and
land travel. As there are a lot of border crossings via
land from Pakistan to India, it was important to include
such land travel data for estimating poliovirus import-
ation into India (scenario 3, Tables 4 and 5).
Table 5 Estimated importations of polio infections into India (2010-2013) (Continued)
Niger 497 1 200 0.78 17,157,042 0
Chad 194 5 1,000 0.56 12,448,175 0
TOTAL 191,530 223 44,600 407,423,640 11
2013
Pakistan 111,794c 93 18,600 0.72 182,142,594 4
Afghanistan 111,370c 14 2,800 0.71 30,551,674 3
Nigeria 34,522b 53 10,600 0.67 173,615,345 1
Somalia 462b 194 38,800 0.47 10,495,583 1
Syria 35,686b 35 7,000 0.52 22,850,000 4
Ethiopia 18,106b 9 1,800 0.7 94,100,756 0
Kenya 40,484c 14 2,800 0.82 44,353,691 1
Cameroon 1,515b 4 800 0.88 21,699,631 0
TOTAL 353,939 416 83,200 579,809,274 13
a [30]
b Data from United Nations World Tourism Organization
c [29]
d [31]
e [27]
f [28]
NA = not available
NC = not calculated
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Conclusions
As long as polio exists anywhere in the world, it can be
imported anywhere. Our model can be applied to all
countries and provides an additional tool to estimate the
risk of importation based on the main contributing factors
such as travel volume and polio endemicity. In particular,
for countries that are vulnerable to polio outbreaks due to
poor national polio immunization coverage rates, our
model may help guide policy-makers to decide whether
imposing an entry requirement in terms of proof of vac-
cination against polio would be justified.
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